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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the political, institutional and economic sources of 
public deficit volatility. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel 
data models and a sample of 125 countries analyzed from 1980 to 2006, we show that 
higher public deficit volatility is typically associated with higher levels of political 
instability and less democracy. In addition, public deficit volatility tends to be 
magnified for small countries, in the outcome of hyper-inflation episodes and for 
countries with a high degree of openness. 
Keywords: public deficit, volatility, political instability, institutions. 
JEL Classification: E31, E63. 5
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Non-technical summary 
A major economic development of the post-World War II era is the rise and persistence 
of fiscal deficits in a wide range of developed and developing countries. 
Economists generally recognize that high and volatile fiscal deficits can be harmful to 
welfare for several reasons. First, they can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources 
and act as a constraint to the private sector by generating "crowding-out" effects. 
Second, by raising the debt-to-GDP ratio, they may negatively impact on a country’s 
long-run fiscal sustainability, therefore, affecting the living standards of future 
generations. Third, they can increase the level and volatility of inflation, in particular, 
when there is a lack of independence of the central bank. 
Many academics have devoted a great effort to understanding the determinants of the 
large public deficits, but surprisingly the literature on public deficit volatility is 
inexistent. The major goal of this paper is, therefore, to empirically assess the sources of 
public deficit volatility, in particular, by focusing on the role played by political, 
institutional and economic determinants. 
Using a system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample 
covering 125 countries from 1980 to 2006, we show that a higher level of political 
instability leads to an increase in public deficit volatility. Moreover, the empirical 
findings suggest that the political regime and the country size are other important 
sources of public deficit instability. In addition, we find that a higher level of inflation 
and a larger deficit (in percentage of GDP) lead to an increase of deficit volatility. 
Finally, richer countries are well characterized by stable deficits. 
We believe that this paper’s analysis and implications are a valuable contribution to 
academics and policymakers. By improving the quality of their institutions, creating 
conditions for government stability and moving towards democratic regimes, countries 
can make substantial progress towards the achievement of long-term economic 
prosperity.6
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable (name) Observ. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum Source
log[￿ (Defi;t￿1)] 1287 0.42 1.01 -4.18 4.45 IMF-WEO
Polity Scale 1226 1.63 7.25 -10.00 10.00 Polity IV
Cabinet Changes 1359 0.38 0.53 0.00 4.00 CNTS
Government Crises 1352 0.10 0.33 0.00 3.00 CNTS
Population 1488 8.46 2.03 2.60 14.06 WDI-WB
De￿cit 1287 3.83 6.94 -39.00 57.95 IMF-WEO
Income 1520 9.68 3.37 -17.37 16.53 IMF-IFS
In￿ ation 1450 43.73 372.98 -25.74 9963.08 IMF-IFS
Openness 1458 66.08 53.50 6.95 983.67 WDI-WB
Sources:
CNTS: Cross-National Time Series database.
IMF-IFS: International Financial Statistics - International Monetary Fund.
IMF-WEO: World Economic Outlook - World Bank.
Polity IV: Polity IV database.
WDI-WB: World Development Indicators - World Bank.12
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Table 2: De￿cit volatility for 3-year periods.
De￿cit Volatility (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L. De￿cit Volatility 0.141** 0.174*** 0.110** 0.090* 0.094**
[0.057] [0.054] [0.050] [0.047] [0.047]
Polity Scale -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.028***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Cabinet Changes 0.143** 0.129* 0.107 0.113* 0.120**
[0.069] [0.069] [0.065] [0.060] [0.059]
Government Crises 0.376*** 0.434*** 0.303*** 0.361*** 0.361***
[0.130] [0.126] [0.111] [0.107] [0.109]
Population -0.165*** -0.144*** -0.119*** -0.119***
[0.031] [0.033] [0.042] [0.040]
De￿cit (% of GDP) 0.036** 0.032* 0.031*
[0.018] [0.016] [0.016]
Real GDP per Capita -0.059 -0.056 -0.053
[0.051] [0.048] [0.047]
In￿ ation 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]




Time -0.034** -0.029* -0.002 -0.015 -0.018
[0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018]
Constant 0.366*** 1.844*** 2.049*** 1.644** 1.634**
[0.098] [0.289] [0.550] [0.635] [0.629]
Observations 753 753 711 705 705
# Countries 125 125 124 124 124
Hansen (p-value) 0.41 0.28 0.35 0.54 0.60
AR2 (p-value) 0.67 0.81 0.71 0.51 0.52
Note: Estimation method is Blundell and Bond (1998). Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard
errors in brackets.
￿ statistically signi￿cant at 10% level;
￿￿ at 5% level;
￿￿￿ at 1% level.14
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Table 3: Results using interaction variables (de￿cit).
De￿cit Volatility (1) (2) (3) (4)
L. De￿cit Volatility 0.041 0.078* 0.092** 0.076*
[0.041] [0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
Polity Scale -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.025***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Cabinet Changes 0.093 0.127**
[0.071] [0.060]
Cabinet Changes * 0.002 0.006
(De￿cit ￿ 3%) [0.011] [0.011]
Cabinet Changes * -0.037 -0.041
(De￿cit < 3%) [0.031] [0.029]
Government Crises 0.343*** 0.409***
[0.108] [0.106]
Government Crises * 0.028 0.028
(De￿cit ￿ 3%) [0.017] [0.017]
Government Crises * 0.146 0.201**
(De￿cit < 3%) [0.099] [0.097]
Population -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.121*** -0.123***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041]
De￿cit (% of GDP) 0.033** 0.028* 0.030**
[0.014] [0.015] [0.014]
De￿cit ￿ 3% 0.060***
[0.014]
De￿cit < 3% -0.044*
[0.023]
Real GDP per Capita -0.055* -0.059 -0.053 -0.056
[0.032] [0.052] [0.051] [0.050]
In￿ ation 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Merchandise Trade (% of GDP) 0.001 0.003* 0.004* 0.003*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Time 0.005 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017]
Constant 1.676*** 1.835*** 1.670** 1.773***
[0.514] [0.655] [0.675] [0.656]
Observations 705 705 705 705
# Countries 124 124 124 124
Hansen (p-value) 0.97 0.70 0.56 0.64
AR2 (p-value) 0.45 0.59 0.56 0.59
Note: Estimation method is Blundell and Bond (1998). Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard
errors in brackets.
￿ statistically signi￿cant at 10% level;
￿￿ at 5% level;
￿￿￿ at 1% level.15
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Table 4: Results using interaction variables (in￿ ation).
De￿cit Volatility (1) (2) (3) (4)
L. De￿cit Volatility 0.113** 0.087* 0.087* 0.086*
[0.046] [0.049] [0.044] [0.048]
Polity Scale -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.026***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Cabinet Changes 0.123* 0.125*
[0.066] [0.071]
Cabinet Changes * 0.000 0.000
(In￿ ation ￿ 50%) [0.000] [0.001]
Cabinet Changes * 0.002 0.001
(In￿ ation < 50%) [0.004] [0.005]
Government Crises 0.370*** 0.383***
[0.112] [0.103]
Government Crises * 0.000** 0.000
(In￿ ation ￿ 50%) [0.000] [0.001]
Government Crises * 0.010* 0.013**
(In￿ ation < 50%) [0.006] [0.007]
Population -0.113*** -0.130*** -0.121** -0.126***
[0.040] [0.039] [0.050] [0.045]
De￿cit (% of GDP) 0.034** 0.034** 0.032** 0.034**
[0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Real GDP per Capita -0.053 -0.058 -0.063 -0.063
[0.043] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048]
In￿ ation 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
In￿ ation ￿ 50% 0.000**
[0.000]
In￿ ation < 50% -0.003
[0.005]
Merchandise Trade (% of GDP) 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.003*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Time -0.018 -0.01 -0.012 -0.009
[0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016]
Constant 1.607*** 1.801*** 1.741*** 1.838***
[0.603] [0.627] [0.616] [0.655]
Observations 705 705 705 705
# Countries 124 124 124 124
Hansen (p-value) 0.97 0.62 0.66 0.69
AR2 (p-value) 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.68
Note: Estimation method is Blundell and Bond (1998). Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard
errors in brackets.
￿ statistically signi￿cant at 10% level;
￿￿ at 5% level;
￿￿￿ at 1% level.17
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As a ￿nal robustness check, we consider alternative measures of de￿cit volatility. To
be more speci￿c, we estimate the baseline model using standard deviations of the general
government budget de￿cit (as percentage of GDP) for consecutive, non-overlapping, 2-year
and 4-year periods, and compare the results with the ones taken from Column 5 of Table 1,
where we consider consecutive, non-overalapping 3-year periods instead.
Table 6 provides a summary of the results and globally con￿rm the previous ￿ndings
both in terms of signi￿cance and magnitude of the coe¢ cients associated with the political,
institutional and economic determinants of public de￿cit volatility. In particular, it shows
that: (i) a greater number of government crises and a lower level of democracy are typically
associated with a higher de￿cit volatility; (ii) Population is highly signi￿cant and its negative
coe¢ cient suggests that smaller countries are exposed to larger idiosyncratic shocks; (iii)
De￿cit and In￿ation are signi￿cant and have the expected positive sign, although the impact
of in￿ ation is small in quantitative terms; and (iv) both the Real GDP per Capita and the
EU-15 dummy variable are not statistically signi￿cant, but their estimated coe¢ cients are
negative.
Table 6: Alternative measures of de￿cit volatility.
2-year 3-year 4-year
De￿cit Volatility rolling sample rolling sample rolling sample
L. De￿cit Volatility 0.118** 0.094** -0.093
[0.062] [0.047] [0.113]
Polity Scale -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.030***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
Cabinet Changes 0.051 0.120** -0.073
[0.069] [0.059] [0.081]
Government Crises 0.161* 0.361*** 0.236**
[0.090] [0.109] [0.119]
Population -0.134*** -0.119*** -0.203***
[0.033] [0.040] [0.049]
De￿cit (% of GDP) 0.030** 0.031* 0.041*
[0.014] [0.016] [0.022]
Real GDP per Capita -0.030 -0.053 -0.038
[0.040] [0.047] [0.059]
In￿ ation 0.000** 0.000** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Merchandise Trade (% of GDP) 0.001 0.004** -0.001
[0.001] [0.002] 0.0021
EU15 -0.222 -0.002 -0.063
[0.172] [0.158] 0.148
Time -0.006 -0.018 -0.017
[0.0120] [0.018] [0.027]
Constant 1.264*** 1.634** 2.848***
[0.482] [0.629] [0.749]
Observations 1117 705 491
# Countries 124 124 121
Hansen (p-value) 1.00 0.60 0.38
AR2 (p-value) 0.05 0.52 0.40
Note: Estimation method is Blundell and Bond (1998). Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard
errors in brackets.
￿ statistically signi￿cant at 10% level;
￿￿ at 5% level;
￿￿￿ at 1% level.19
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the political, institutional and economic sources of public de￿cit
volatility. Using a system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample
covering 125 countries from 1980 to 2006, we show that a higher level of political instability
leads to an increase in public de￿cit volatility. The e⁄ects are magni￿ed in the face of
episodes of hyper-in￿ ation and quantitatively large: an additional cabinet change raises de￿cit
volatility by 15%, while a new incoming signal of goverment crisis increases it by 45%.
In addition, we ￿nd the political regime and the country size are other important sources
of the instability of the budget de￿cit. We show that: (i) when the Polity Scale (greater
democracy) increases by one point, the ￿scal de￿cit volatility falls by 3%; and (ii) smaller
countries have, in general, more volatile budget de￿cits as a result a larger output volatility
and wider exposure to idiosyncratic shocks.
Finally, the empirical ￿ndings suggest that high in￿ ation rate and a large de￿cit-to-GDP
ratio are typically associated to de￿cit instability. Moreover, richer countries - that is, the
ones where real GDP per capita is larger - are frequently characterized by stable budget
de￿cits.
We believe that this paper￿ s analysis and policy implications are an important contribu-
tion to academics and governments. By improving the quality of their institutions, creating
conditions for government stability, and moving towards democratic regimes, countries can
make substantial progress towards the achievement of long-term economic prosperity.
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